Tuesday, June 18, 2013

PHILOSOPHICAL INDEX FOR THE MOREH NEVUCHIM

1.      Allegory
1.1.   method – when (not) applied II:25 [199-200] (in prophecy; use of linguistic  hints) II:43 [238-40] II:47 [247-9] in using text for mitzvos – midrashim III:43 [353-4]
1.2.   distinguished from metaphor
2.      Anthropomorphism
2.1.   explanation of terms seeming to imply I:1-16,18-30,32-48,65-7,70
2.2.   chazal against  (chazal use anthropomorphic language for G-d just as verses do, relying on their general rejection of anthropomorphism for the reader not to take their words literally) I:46 [59-63]
3.      Aristotle
3.1.   exposition - Aristotle below the sphere of the moon: “for although one substance is common to all, substance without form is in reality impossible, just as the physical form of these transient beings cannot exist without substance.” I:72 [114]  II: Intro [149] II:3-4 [156-8] (necessity of nature) II:13 [173] II:19 [184-9] (arguments for eternity) II:14 [174-6] (aware that his arguments did not demonstrate eternity) II:15 [176-8] (against chance and against design/Creator) II:20 [189-90] (purpose of/in creation) III:8[272-4]
3.2.   opposition - I:69 [103-4] I:71 [111-2] II: Intro [145] II:6 [162] II:13 [171-3] II:16 [178] II:21-4 [190-9] (eternity implies no miracles, so must be rejected) II:25 [199-200] II:29 [210-1] (form independent of matter) III:8 [261] (on providence) III:17 [282-3]
4.      Angels
4.1.   may be referred to by “elokim” I:2 [14] I:27 [36]
4.2.   incorporeal, = intelligences I:43 [57-8] I:49 [65-6] II:6 [160] Incorporeal beings act continuously; effects are determined by the readiness of matter to receive the forms II;12 [168-71]
4.3.   = nature II:6-7 [160-2] (both specific) [161] free will [162-3]
the word “angel” can refer to a prophet II:34 [223] Angels on Jacob’s ladder = prophets I:15 [26]
4.4.   since prophecy is necessary for the Law, and prophecy is received through angels, so belief in angels is necessary for the Law, so the keruvim!! {even though Moshe’s prophecy was not through an angel!?} III:45 [356]
5.      Attributes of G-d
5.1.   types I:52 [69-72]
5.2.   inadmissible - (violates unity) I:51-3 [68-74] (psychological) I:54 [75-8] (passivity = being affected, includes emotions) I:55 [78-9] Category mistake of attributes with respect to G-d I:58 [83]
5.3.   must prove inadmissible I: 55 [78] I:60 [87-9]
5.4.   for the public we admit attributes that they take to be necessary for perfection I:26 [35] I:35 [49-50] I:46 [59-61] I:47 [63-4] (same for angels) I:49 [65-7]
5.5.   refer to actions I:52 [72] I:54 [75-8]
5.6.   negative I:57-60 [80-9] (all attributes are either actions or negative) I:58 [83]
6.       Chazal
fallibility II:8 [163] still appropriate to interpret their words as true insofar as possible) III:14 [278-9] Statements of chazal that contradict his theories (treated with respect and as source for valid ideas) II:26 [201] “I am unable to explain it sufficiently”
7.      Creation
7.1.   purpose of II:11 [167-8] III:13 [272-7] (agency implies purpose, but see 276 which attributes creation to Will and no other object = purpose, and see 308 that all G-d’s action are for (a) purpose(s)) [272] (purpose of A implies an agent that made A, so anything not made has no purpose, so G-d has no purpose, and for Aristotle the universe as a whole has no purpose) [272] (believers in creation must say that Will/Wisdom created the universe and stop there in inquiring for the purpose) [274,277] (Will created, so each thing exists for its own sake {except some that exist for others}) [274-5] (man is not the purpose of the whole creation, just of what is below the moon) [273-4,277-9] (“G-d created A to do X” does not mean that doing X is A’s purpose, but only that A was created in such a way that it would do X) [275-6] (superior is not created for the sake of inferior, so spheres etc not created for man) [276-7] the whole creation is the result of G-d’s wisdom to produce the existence of everything possible since existence is good but not all for man, we do not comprehend His wisdom and therefore wisdom does not imply eternity III: 25 [308-9]
7.2.   Torah begins with the creation = masseh bereishis since it is prerequisite for understanding metaphysics Introduction
7.3.   impossible for man to fully understand Introductionw
7.4.   (different prime matter for heaven and earth) II:26 [201]
7.5.   opinions concerning II:13 [171-3]
7.6.   time is created II:13 [171-2] (nothing really exists before the creation) II:13 [171]
7.7.   Plato’s theory of II:13 [172] II:25 [199-200]
7.8.   (arguments show only possibility of) II:16 [178] II:17-8 [181-3]
7.9.   (reasons for superiority over eternity by comparing both with what is known from nature) II:19 [184-9] (especially the heavens) [188-9] II:21-4 [190-9] (eternity/necessity cannot explain the heavens; design makes explanation possible) [193-4] (weight of objections) [195]
7.10.                    (Biblical account not entirely literal, for literal understanding of all of it might lead to corrupt ideas and false opinions about G-d or to reject Torah altogether) II:29 [211] (literal leads to eternity) III:29 [319] II:30 [212-18]
7.10.1.  details of creation taken non-literally II:30 [212-18] – “et” = together with {heavens and earth all their contents}, simultaneous creation of heaven and earth, lights created on first day, “earth” = everything below the sphere of the moon [? – is it really non-literal?], “caslling a name” = distinguishing things that satisfy a common noun [?], chosech = fire [?], chosech above the air [?], “mayim” = proto-water out of which water below and above and rakia are made, “good” = permanent, regular settled order [?], all of chapter 2 took place during the six days, He tok him (Adam) and placed him – refers to position and rank, not location, “yatzar” = to make a form (= create the abstract form or in in-form something?) [?]
7.11.                    finished in six days – chapter 2 takes place during the six days II:30 [215] Laws of nature do not apply during the six days of creation I:67 [99] II:30 [216] Shabbos = no new creation I:67 [99-100]
8.      Divine providence
8.1.   control/causation (over whole earth) I:44 [58]
8.2.   protection I:23 [33]
8.3.   providence – various theories III:17-8 [282-90]
8.3.1.      all is accident and chance – refuted by Aristotle [282]
8.3.2.      Aristotle – providence is only above the moon where things are constant – below is chance [282-3]
8.3.3.      everything is due to providence = predestination – implies divine injustice [283-4]
8.3.4.      man has free will and providence affects all events and there is no injustice in providence – implies absurdities (and foreknowledge contradicts free will!)
8.3.5.      the Torah – (1) Prophets and sages; (2) later authors; (3) Rambam’s view
8.3.5.1. free will, no injustice – all evils are punishment for sin and all pleasures are reward for mitzvah – no suffering in this world for reward in the next, [285]  reward/punishment for actions which logic show to be right/wrong, even if not commanded [286]
8.3.5.2.??
8.3.5.3. [286-8] (explanation of how providence works based on Rambam’s  understanding of prophetic works) individual providence below the moon only for humans – implied by reward and punishment, mediated by Divine intellectual influence to those who possess intellect, for other individuals agrees with Aristotle, no “special divine Will” for individual events of non-humans {perhaps because there is no aspect of justice in what happens to them – this would have no implications about Divine control of those events??}, proved by Biblical denials of equality between people and animals, the ship goes down by chance but it is not chance who is on board, no divine providence for animals justifies our killing them for our use, providing for animals = providence for the species and not for its individuals {but Species have no external existence – they are only conceptual III:18 [289]}, principle lesson is that “management”, “knowledge” “intention” etc. has no common meaning between human and Divine III: 23 [303]
8.3.5.3.1.      providence as protection III:18 [289-90] source in divine influence therefore varies as possession of intellect [289] and varies as goodness [289] protection is absolute [290]
8.3.6.      petition in order to impress divine providence III:36 [331-2]
8.4.   Permissible to kill animals since they have no intellect and hence are not under individual Divine providence III:17 [287]

9.      Eternity of the world
9.1.   statement of positions II:13 [171-3]
9.2.   past [Aristotle] I:71 [111] (arguments for) II:14 [174-6] (refutation of arguments) II:18 [181-3] II:30 [212]  (“admissible” = possible) II:16 [178]
9.3.   (argument for depends upon assumption of constant laws of nature) II:17 [178-81]
9.4.   future (possible) II:27 [201-2] (Solomon believed, and is correct) II:28 [202-4]
10.  Evil
10.1.                    nature – privation I:22 [32] III:10 [266-7] types (minority of existence) III:12 [267-72]
10.2.                    G-d’s creation of……..(only the end of the sequence matters for the judgment of justice) III:19 [290-1]
10.3.                    all evils are punishment for sin and all pleasures are reward for mitzvah III:17 [285] divine providence is perfect protection from evil III:51 [389]
11.  Free will
11.1.                    nature
11.2.                    existence obvious I:51 [70]
11.3.                    who possesses – man has free will (contrast animals that have only will) II:16 II:48 [249] III:17 [282-8] Intelligences, angels II:7 [168-9]
11.4.                    relation to G-d’s providence – view of prophets and sages - free will, no injustice – all evils are punishment for sin and all pleasures are reward for mitzvah – no suffering in this world for reward in the next, III:17 [285] 
12.  G-d
12.1.                    no relation to any creature, hence no similarity to any creature, hence words that are used for creatures and for G-d are homonyms [even “existence” and “unity”] I:56-7 [79-81] I:57 [80-1] see also Attributes of G-d
12.2.                    impossible to understand how He moves the world I:72 [119]
12.3.                    unity I:58 [81-3]
12.4.                    absolute independent existence, implies unity II:1 [152-3]
12.5.                    will or wisdom I:69 [104] II:18 [183] III:13 [272-7] (will = for no purpose) III:26 [310]
12.6.                    first cause I:69 [102-5] (through intermediaries – including man’s free will; includes [all?] natural events) II:48 [249-50]
12.7.                    nature = His works, so “He did” may describe natural effect I:66 [98-9]
12.8.                    “do” = oseh implies pre-existing materials and existing result; “bara” = create may be either without pre-existing materials [as in the creation of the universe] or without existing result [as in privations like darkness and evil] so all His actions/creations are perfectly good III:10 [265-6]
12.9.                    we do not ascribe doing what is impossible, including making another like himself or changing, corporifying or annihilating Himself III:15 [279]
12.10.                all His actions are good = successfully producing an important purpose III:25 [307-8] the whole creation is the result of G-d’s wisdom [308-9]
12.11.                omniscience – doubted because of evil III:16 [280-2] III:19 [290-2] the nature of His knowledge III:20-1 [292-6] does not imply plurality [292] unchanging (foresees the future) [292-3] includes what is non-existent and the infinite [293-4] philosophers objections based on false assumption that His knowledge is like ours when in fact his knowledge is identical to His essence and unknowable (and yet we day it is one, unchanging contains non-existent and infinite etc – unless these descriptions are meant negatively) [293-4] He knows as Creator via knowledge of His essence (knowledge of produces vs. knowledge of observer of mechanism) [293, 296] His knowledge does not change the character of possibility for future events [294]
12.12.                providence – see Divine Providence
12.13.                love of G-d produced by knowledge of the truths of the Law including true knowledge of His existence III:52 [392 – compare/contrast yesodie haTorah
12.14.                sustains the creation I:69 [105] I:70 [105-7]
12.15.                III:53 [392-3]: chesed = no claim at all on the benefit; tzedaka = claim via good character of giver; mishpat = claim via zechus/din/what the recipient deserves (including punishment)
12.16.                Incorporeality
12.16.1.                      required for unity I:1 [13]
12.16.2.                      “Show me Your glory” = Yourself I:64 [96]
12.16.3.                      Category mistake of attributes with respect to G-d I:58 [83]
12.17.                names of Names of G-d I:61 [89-91] I:63 [93-5]
12.17.1.                      elokim = judge I:2 [14] II:30 [218]
13.  Heavens
13.1.                    unchanging I:11 [24] (opinions) II:13 [171-3]
13.2.                    general description I:72 [113-9] II:4-5 [156-60] (and relation to the earth) II:10 [164-6] II:11 [167-8] (size) III:13 [277-9]
14.  Intellect
14.1.                    essence/form of man I:1 [13-14], I:7 [20] I:70 [106]
14.2.                    limits of ability (due to connection to physical) I:31-2 [40-3]
14.3.                    relation to body I:72 [119]
14.4.                    source in the active intellect I:68 [100-2] II:4 [158] II:37 [227-9]
14.5.                    the active intellect is the link between man and G-d III:51 [385-6]
14.6.                    If the active intellect reaches only the logical faculty and not the imaginative, the result is wisdom; if it reaches only the imaginative and not the logical the result is statesmen, lawgivers, diviners, charmers and true dreams II:37-8 [228-30]
15.  Knowledge of G-d
15.1.                    Achieved via analysis of nature I:19 [29] I:34 [45-6] I;38 [54] I:55 [78]  I:70 [107]
15.2.                    via knowledge of attributes of action I:54 [75-8]
15.3.                    via negative attributes I:58-60 [81-89]
16.  man
16.1.                    free will (contrast animals that have only will) II:48 [249] III:17 [282-8]
16.2.                    naturally social II:39 [232] III:27 [313]
16.3.                    made in form and likeness of G-d due to intellect I:1 [14], I:2 [15] III:8 [261]
16.4.                    microcosm of the universe because of his intellect I:73 [117-9]
16.5.                    most compound/complex being, hence most individual variation II:40 [232-3]
16.6.                    failures due to his matter; merits due to his form III:8 [261-4] (material part blocks perception of abstract ideal) III:9 [264-5] III:12 [268-9]
16.7.                    goal/highest success = knowledge of G-d, angels and the rest of creation according to his capacity = being together with G-d III:8 [261-4] (perfection of soul = knowledge of all that is capable of being known and that does not include any action) III:27 [312-3] III:51 [384-6] even one who possesses knowledge of G-d must constantly focus consciously on G-d – if he diverts his focus he loses Divine protection but if he maintains the focus his protection is absolute III:51 [386-7, 388-90 – compare 285, 300] order of development: focus during shema and prayer; when alone; when interacting with others III:51 [387-8] we should be conscious that we are always in the presence of the king (= active intellect which is the link between us and G-d) III:52 [391-2] Man’s obligation is to be like G-d I:54 [78]
16.8.                    III:54 [393-7: chochma = i) knowledge of truths that lead to [and include] knowledge of G-d, ii) workmanship, iii) moral principles, iv) cunning; not= truths received by tradition – knowledge of the Law not= chochma, but the right order is to learn them by tradition first and learn to prove them later; Moses was the wisest of all men [Solomon only wiser than those in his generation]; four recognized perfections: possessions, bodily, moral [principles, knowledge of G-d – first three are external [in different senses]; [moral principles not the goal since they are for helping others and that presupposes some other ultimate purpose]; prophets agree with philosophers on this; verse in Jer. finishes that G-d desires that we perform the actions that He performs and loves
16.9.                    inter-personal evils due to ignorance (Plato) III:11 [267]
16.10.                Satan has no power over his nefesh III:22 [298]
17.  miracles
17.1.                     (only temporary changes in nature) II:29 [210] III:50 [382]
17.2.                    (cannot be explained figuratively) II:25 [199-201]
17.3.                     (unique miracles of Moses) II35 [224] Not all Israel saw the sun stopped by Joshua [meaning that although they saw the sun stop, they did not see that Joshua stopped it?] II:35 [224]
17.4.                    (the nature of man is never changed by miracle) III:32 [325]
18.  Metaphor
18.1.                    method – when applied
18.2.                    distinguished from allegory
18.3.                    examples I:54 [95-6]
19.  non-literal interpretation – principles –
19.1.                    instruction in theology via allegories and parables due to lack of fixed method, sometimes the lesson is only part of the allegory and sometimes divided between several allegories, Introduction [   ]
19.2.                    requires some explicit use of the non-literal meaning in some Biblical text I:1-49 passim
20.  Objectivity [mussar]
20.1.                    desires make objectivity impossible I:2 [15] I:5 [18-9] I:34 [47] II:23 [195] (bodily pleasures prevent prophecy) II:36 [226-7] III:8 [261-4] III:33 [327] (bodily desires prevent love/attachment of G-f) III:51 [390]
20.2.                    factors in opposition of I:31 [41] I:34 [47]
21.  Plato
21.1.                    theory of creation II:13 [172] II:25 [199-200]
22.  Proof
22.1.                    types
22.2.                    reliability – absolute I:31 [41] (implied superior to prophecy) II:16 [178] (demonstrative proof would require giving up Creation; but there is no such proof) II:23,25 [195],[200]
22.3.                    need to prove even obvious propositions I:51 [58-9]
22.4.                    necessary for real knowledge I:55 [78-9]
22.5.                    what is known by proof is equal to revelation II:33 [222] [[BUT note “…in this voice they perceived the first two commandments…[but not] in the same degree and Moses did.” unprovable – aspects of G-d’s knowledge III:21[296]
22.6.                    a miracle cannot prove that which is impossible III:24 [304]
23.  Proofs of G-d’s existence
23.1.                    methodology, via analysis of nature I:34 [45-6] I:70 [107]
23.2.                    via dilemma argument based on false assumption of eternity I:71 [111] II: Intro [145] II:1 [153] II:2 [154-5]
23.3.                    Argument from design III:19 [291-2]
24.  Prophecy
24.1.                    varieties of II:44-5 [240-5]
24.2.                    various opinions of – parallel to views on creation/eternity [?] II:32  [219-21]
24.3.                    absolute certainty of reality – compared to the certainty of perception and logic learned from Akeda III:24 [306]
24.4.                    G-d or angel speaking only in dream or vision II:40 [235] (hence whole sequence of events only in dream or vision II:42 [237-8] (events reported in prophecy concerning the prophet himself generally take place in dream/vision) II:46 [245-7]
24.5.                    provides knowledge beyond the natural II:38 [230]
24.6.                    requires courage and intuition in great measure II:38 [229]
24.7.                    requires control/suppression of bodily pleasures II:36 [226-7]
24.8.                    nature – through an angel I:37 [53] II:34 [223], active intellect + faculty of imagination (natural strength + training) II:36 [225-7]
24.9.                    language of (metaphorical/allegorical) II:29 [204-12] (including exaggeration, even in Chumash) II:47 [247-9] (according to the speech of each prophet) [204] Interpretation of prophetic text is correct just in case it was the intention of the prophet III:4 [257] (no prophecy of the end of the world) [204-10]
24.10.                uniqueness of Moshe I:37 [53] II:33 [221-3] (and uniqueness of Moses’ miracles) II:35 [223-4] II:36 [227] (only prophecy of Moshe reveals commandments – only he commanded others in G-d’s name) II:39 [231-2]
24.11.                Sinai – variety of perceptions with minority receiving real prophecy II:32 [221] only Moses heard the words – the people heard the voice/sound but not words II:33 [222-3] [[BUT see III:24 [305] below under “Trials”]], what is known by proof is equal to revelation II:33 [222] [[BUT note “…in this voice they perceived the first two commandments…[but not] in the same degree and Moses did.”
24.12.                necessary precondition for mitzvos/Law III:44 [355]
24.13.                III:51 [385]: “There are some who direct all their mind toward the attainment of perfection in Metaphysics, devote themselves entirely to God, exclude from their thought every other thing, and employ all their intellectual faculties in the study of the Universe, in order to derive therefrom a proof for the existence of God, and to learn in every possible way how God rules all things; they form the class of those who have entered the palace, namely, the class of prophets” [??]
25.  Possibility and impossibility
26.  Reasons for commandments
26.1.                    general principles - (correct beliefs and physical well-being) II:31 [219] II:40 [232-4] III:27 [312-3] (balanced – natural for persons of good character) II:39 [231-2] (every commandment has a reason though some are unknown) III:26 [310] (against those who say that if it has a reason then it is not from G-d since He is above all reason) III:31 [321-2] (to give reason = to show consequences for true belief or actions that improve society) III:28 [314] Law does not take into account exceptional circumstances III:34 [328-9] laws between man and G-d also affect other men but only after a long process III:35 [331] only showing purpose for law as in verses, not in Torah she baal peh III:41 [344] mitzvah that had meaning in specific historical circumstances are made permanent in order to recall those events in later times {and this might be a reason why sacrifices will be done even in the future when no one worships idols} III:46 [361] the Law uses safeguards III:48 [372] reasons only for general rules – details (e.g. of sacrifices) have no purpose (other than man’s obedience) III:26 [311-2]
26.2.                    threats concerning idolatry opposite of what priests of idolatry promised III:30 [321] III:37 [336-7] Severity of idolatry I:36 [50-2]
26.3.                    only gradual changes possible so impossible to abandon sacrifices entirely but they are very limited and downgraded by the prophets III:32 [322-6] (G-d does not change the nature of man in order to make actions possible [323-5]
26.4.                    reduce desires, personal decency III:33 [327-8]
26.5.                    killing animal that has killed a person or involved in immorality is a fine for the owner III:40 [342]
26.6.                    red heifer rules designed to find the killer III:40 [343]
26.7.                    severity of punishment according to greatness of the sin, frequency, amount of temptation, ease of doing sin secretly III:41 [345]
26.8.                    rules for zaken mamre and wrong psak {need clarification} III:41 [348]
26.9.                    death for any transgression does as a demonstration of unbelief III:41 [348-9]
26.10.                our object is to lead mankind to the service of G-d and to a good social order III:41 [350]
26.11.                explanation of Sabbath and holidays starts with physical and social benefits and only then to symbolism III:43 [352-3] the Law follows nature and brings it to perfection [352] the Sages [sometimes] use the text as poetry to express their own ideas – they are not interpreting the text – so midrashim not to be taken as interpretations III:43 [353-4]
26.12.                Since prophecy is necessary for the Law, and prophecy is received through angels, so belief in angels is necessary for the Law, so the keruvim!! {even though Moshe’s prophecy was not through an angel!?} III:45 [356]
26.13.                has no reason for table and bread in mikdash III:45 [356] and no reason for wine offering III:46 [366] and purification procedure from leprosy III:47 [370]
26.14.                the greater the sin the lower the species from which the sacrifice is brought III:46 [363]
26.15.                congregational sin offerings imply that we, our children and our children’s children owe atonement for our sin III:46 [364]
26.16.                the easier the diffusion of the uncleanness the harder and slower its purification III:47 [368]
26.17.                forbidden food is unhealthy III:48 [370] simanim are only signs of what is permitted, not the reason; forbidden to torture {even psychologically!} animals, these rules to produce kindness in people III:48 [371]
26.18.                circumcision reduces sexual pleasure III:48 [378-9]
26.19.                kesuba is like pay of harlot or hired servant III:48 [374-5]
26.20.                most of the mitzvos whose reasons are unknown were against idolatry whose past details are unknown to us III:49 [380]
26.21.                correct beliefs (theology only in general terms, to be expanded via knowledge of other science {implied in commandment to love G-d} and detailed beliefs that lead to good social relations),  III:28 [313-5]
26.22.                love and fear is the entire purpose of service/commandments III:29 [317]
27.  Scientific method
27.1.                    nature – simplicity etc II:9 [164] II:11 [167] (balance of evidence for and against) II:22 [194] II:24 [198] (kinematics vs. dynamics) II:38 [230]
27.1.1.  order of investigation Intro [4] I:5 [18] I:33-4 [43-9]
27.1.2.  character of investigator  – caution I:5 [18-9], restriction to appropriate subjects I:21 [30-1]
27.2.                    reliability
28.  Soul
28.1.                    relation to intellect
28.2.                    after death I:40-1 [55-6] I:70 [106]
29.  Subjects to be hidden 
29.1.                    includes natural science Intro [3], I:17 [27]
29.2.                    “secrets of the Law” (theological topics, “metaphysics”) I:33 [44] I:35 [49] I:62 [93] (revelation at Sinai one of the secrets) II:33 [223] (Incorporeality of G-d) II:47 [249] (account of the chariot) III:Introduction [251]
29.3.                    reason to be hidden
30.   “The Torah speaks in man’s language” I:26 [35] I:53 [73]
31.  Wisdom
31.1.                    value I:30 [39-40] I:42 [57]

Miscellaneous topics
Emes/sheker vs. /tov/ra I:2 [14-6]I:6 [19]

Male/female = form/matter I:17 [27]

Comparisons to Ramchal - superior value of hidden meaning Intro [6], justification for revealing: “time to do for Hashem” and pure motivation Intro [9], impossible to understand how G-d moves the world I:72 [119] prophecy is the highest human achievement II:36 [225] G-d does only good III:10

Onkelos method I:21 [31-2], I:27 [35-7], I:28 [38] I:48 [64-5] I:67 [98-9] II:33 [222-3]

Atheism I:36 not as bad as idol worship – only latter must be killed since they may mislead others III:51 [384]

Belief requires understanding I:50-1 [67-9]

Moses greatest of the wise, prays for guidance to govern I:54 [75-8] II:28 [204]


Knower = knowing = known even for people I:68 [100-2]

Knowledge of philosophy and science lost from Jewish People I:71 [107-8] II:11 [168] III: Introduction (account of chariot entirely Rambam’s own ideas) III: Introduction (scientific/astronomical knowledge – therefore appropriate to accept knowledge from others;


Text of prayers is source for positions of chazal II:5 [159]

The number four II:10 [166]



All languages conventional II:30 [218]


The nature of imagination II:36 [225-7]


The nature of possibility and Rambam does not know whether imagining establishes possibility III:15 [279]



“Thoughts of sin are worse than sin” because the thought contaminates the greatest part of the person, and similarly for low speach III:8 [263]

Holiness of Hebrew = no words for private parts/actions III:8 [264] III:48 [374]

Species have no external existence – they are only conceptual III:18 [289]

Objection: “G-d knows since He created the eye He will see etc.” implies that G-d must be physical. Rambam’s answer: creating the eye implies that He understands sight implies that He has all the knowledge that sight can provide III:19 [291]


The book of Job III:22-3 [296-303] Introduction is certainly a fiction [296] place of Satan is below, unlike other angels [297] Job and friends thought G-d and not Satan was the source of his suffering, wisdom is not ascribed to Job [297] order of suffering according to estimation of common man and no one can withstand too much bodily suffering [297] Satan = yetzer hara = malach hamves, many verses concerning Satan {perhaps Satan = matter hence vs. intellect = nefesh = form} [298-9] the key lesson: “As soon as he had acquired a true knowledge of God, he confessed that there is undoubtedly true felicity in the knowledge of God; it is attained by all who acquire that knowledge, and no earthly trouble can disturb it. So long as job's knowledge of God was based on tradition and communication, and not on research, he believed that such imaginary good as is possessed in health, riches, and children, was the utmost that men can attain: this was the reason why he was in perplexity” [300-1] opinions of the three friends = main positions concerning providence [301-2] the answer in the book is in the speech of Elihu in the metaphor of the angel’s intercession [302] also account of prophecy and learning through nature [302-3] principle lesson is that “management”, “knowledge” “intention” etc. has no common meaning between human and Divine [303]

Trials III:24 [304-7] purpose to teach man what to do or to believe [304] “to know” = “to make known” [304] a miracle cannot prove that which is impossible [304] revelation at Sinai prevents later false prophets since “If I had come as a messenger as you desired, and had told you that which had been said unto me and which you had not heard, you would perhaps consider as true what another might tell you in opposition to that which you heard from me. But it is different now, as you have heard it in the midst of the great sight."

Darkei haemori III:37 [334-5]

Mercy on sinners is cruelty to all creatures III:39 [341]

The words of the Law do not become unclean III:47 [369]

Every detail of the narratives of the Law is necessary to establish true belief or regulate actions and order society III:50 [380-4]
Details give credibility to narratives
War of four kings shows providence for G-d’s servant
List of families of Seir to identify Amelek
Kings of Edom to illustrate the usefulness of our law not to accept foreigners as kings
Jericho should not be rebuilt so that the vertical submersion of the walls should be permanent evidence that it was not conquered naturally

Miriam achieved knowledge and love of G-d III:51 [391]




           






Thursday, April 11, 2013


ADVICE FOR PARENTS AND EDUCATORS

The following scenario has recently come to my attention: A person in his [or her – below understood] late teens or early twenties expresses an idea to a parent or educator [below P/E] that is entirely new to P/E. This idea contradicts some key belief or value of P/E. The idea is from a subject with which P/E is unfamiliar. The idea is expressed in terminology with which P/E is unfamiliar. Impressive authorities are cited as supporting the idea.

The typical reaction of P/E contains the following elements. In terms of feelings and thoughts: surprise and confusion, embarrassment that P/E is unfamiliar with the subject, fear of the cited authorities and [especially from parents] a compensating thought that the child must be very bright to have understood this idea on his own. In terms of action: sometimes P/E reacts in a defensive manner by rejecting the idea in an overly aggressive fashion and criticizes of the child’s intelligence and/or midos. Sometimes P/E is cowed into submission in front of the child and cannot respond at all.

In my opinion, none of the above reactions is justified. Below are my suggestions for how to react in practice. In context I will explain why the feelings and thoughts are also inappropriate.

  1. Always treat the child with respect. The reactions should be calm, interested and non-judgmental. Non-judgmental is all-inclusive: no judgment of the child’s character or motivation [“agenda”], no judgment of the cogency of the ideas he expresses,  no judgment concerning the child’s understanding of the ideas he expresses [see below] and no judgment concerning the child’s intelligence [see below]. In particular, there is no need whatsoever to respond to the ideas he expresses on the spot. If P/E has nothing to say at the time, then the appropriate response is: “Thanks for sharing that with me; I will think about it and get back to you.”
  2. Do not be cowed by impressive sounding technical terminology. Say to the child: “I am not familiar with those terms. Can you please explain them to me?” Listen carefully to the explanation and keep asking until you really understand what he says. Do not fear sounding stupid to ignorant; you sound the exact opposite – interested, respectful and desirous of really understanding. [[Often the result will be that it becomes clear that the child does not understand the terms at all. Then the challenge has been defused. You can invite him to try to clarify his ideas and try again. He learns a valuable lesson that superficially browsing an idea will not be useful to him. Unless he is very motivated to look for challenges, the whole process will stop there.]]
  3. If his explanation of the terminology makes sense, then go back to the idea itself and plug in his explanations of the terms. Often the explanations do not fit the idea – they make the idea clearly false or without foundation. Then you say: “Well, I understand your explanation of the terms, but I do not see why you think the idea has merit.” [[The end result is the same as 1 above.]] [[Notice that if either 2 or 3 occurs, the judgment that the child must be super intelligent is completely out of place.]]
  4. If the terms and the idea now sound reasonable and you know of no reply, say as above:  “Thanks for sharing that with me; I will think about it and get back to you.”  [And see 5.] I can guarantee that there are many people who know the subject and can give you answers that will neutralize the challenge in the idea. All you have to do is write to one of them. [[If you have the energy, you might look at The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here http://plato.stanford.edu/ and check any topic. You will find vast controversy, so that no one position could be regarded as the settled truth. So there will always be intelligent critique of his ideas.]] You then invite the child to another discussion. You should say explicitly that you consulted with others on this subject – let him know that there is a great world out there with people who know these subjects who are available. You then respectfully present your reasons for not accepting his idea and then invite him to try again. [[Do not worry that the invitation reinforces his examination of dangerous ideas etc. The focus must be on winning the war, not the isolated battle. Defusing his motivation temporarily will not be the solution in the long run. He needs to give the project a real effort so that failure will last him for the long run.]]
  5. You can also say: “That is a very interesting idea. Are there other opinions on the subject? Does anyone disagree? What are their reasons? How are their reasons answered by those who believe in the idea?” This has two effects: if he is unaware of any critique of the idea, that brands him as ignorant of the subject. [[And again, the judgment that the child is super intelligent is out of place.]] You can say [with astonishment]: “You mean no one disagrees?” And then next time you can present him with a list of dissenters. Second, if he is aware, then you can ask how he chooses to side with one side over the other.

I have received several such challenges from distraught parents and educators in the last couple of years. The content of the challenges was absurdly weak and irrelevant. The reactions I describe above could have defused the challenge and provided the improvements I described. Instead there was an escalation of conflict so that when I finally became involved all the logic in the world would not dislodge the child from his commitment to his absurd position. What a shame! 

Sunday, March 17, 2013



http://ricochet.com/main-feed/The-Perils-of-Intellectual-Apostasy

Paul A. Rahe · March 14, 2013 at 1:43am
When I was an undergraduate at Cornell , then Yale and a graduate student at Oxford, then Yale once again, the American university was an exceedingly lively place in which students were encouraged to explore a diversity of perspectives. The people in charge were, by and large, New Deal liberals -- moderate in manner, open to argument, and distinguished first and foremost by their curiosity. They welcomed into the ranks of their colleagues both those to their left and those to their right -- for they did not regard the university as an instrument for transforming the world. They supposed, instead, that it was a space within which one could spend one's time trying to understand that world. Intellectual sparring partners were, in their opinion, a great boon.
Most of the New Deal liberals that I once knew have passed on. They have been replaced in positions of authority by a generation for whom everything is political. Its motto is "the personal is political and the political is personal." What this means in practice is that the members of this generation tend to regard those at odds with them not as merely wrong and perhaps intriguingly, interestingly wrong but as simply immoral. In the face of an argument or observation that does not sit comfortably with what they believe, they resort to denunciation. The dissenter is labeled a racist or a fascist or something worse, and he is read out of the human race. In this environment, conservatives are no longer welcome. No advertisement states that they need not apply for jobs at certain institutions, but that is nearly always the case.
The key to understanding what has happened is that the new generation has made of the university a political instrument. Its purpose, as they see it, is to help them transform the larger world. Those not on board with the program are interlopers to be demonized and driven out, and the quality of the scholarly work and the teaching they do has no weight. One can write and be widely read. One can be invited to conferences and to give lectures. But, if a job comes open at a major university, one will not even be interviewed. Trust me. I know from long experience.

Every once in a while, however, something happens that shakes things up, and then one sees that things are, in fact, far worse than one ever imagined. Take, for example, the recent furor regarding Thomas Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False.
Nagel is a distinguished professor of philosophy with an impeccable pedigree. He was born in 1937; did his BA at Cornell, did a B.Phil. at Corpus Christi College, Oxford; and completed his Ph.D. at Harvard in 1963 under the direction of John Rawls before going on to teach at Berkeley, Princeton, and New York University. He has in the intervening years published a host of books, all of them well-received, and he has won just about every honor reserved for members of his profession. On the 4th of July 2012, when he reached the ripe old age of 75, he was at the very top of the heap. But, thanks to his new book, he is rapidly becoming a pariah. The title is sufficient to explain why.
When Steven Pinker of Harvard turned to Twitter and denounced the book as “the shoddy reasoning of a once-great thinker,” Leon Wieseltier, a throwback to the old days of New Deal liberalism who has been the literary editor of The New Republic for decades, responded:
Here was a signal to the Darwinist dittoheads that a mob needed to be formed. In an earlier book Nagel had dared to complain of “Darwinist imperialism,” though in his scrupulous way he added that “there is really no reason to assume that the only  alternative to an evolutionary explanation of everything is a religious one.” He is not, God forbid, a theist. But he went on to warn that “this may not be comforting enough” for the materialist establishment, which may find it impossible to tolerate also “any cosmic order of which mind is an irreducible and non-accidental part.” For the bargain-basement atheism of our day, it is not enough that there be no God: there must be only matter. Now Nagel’s new book fulfills his old warning. A mob is indeed forming, a mob of materialists, of free-thinking inquisitors. “In the present climate of a dominant scientific naturalism, heavily dependent on speculative Darwinian explanations of practically everything, and armed to the teeth against religion,” Nagel calmly writes, “... I would like to extend the boundaries of what is not regarded as unthinkable, in light of how little we really understand about the world.” This cannot be allowed! And so the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Secular Faith sprang into action. “If there were a philosophical Vatican,” Simon Blackburndeclared in the New Statesman, “the book would be a good candidate for going on to the Index.” . . .
I understand that nobody is going to burn Nagel’s book or ban it. These inquisitors are just more professors. But he is being denounced not merely for being wrong. He is being denounced also for being heretical. I thought heresy was heroic. I guess it is heroic only when it dissents from a doctrine with which I disagree. Actually, the defense of heresy has nothing to do with its content and everything to do with its right. Tolerance is not a refutation of heresy, but a retirement of the concept. I am not suggesting that there is anything outrageous about the criticism of Nagel’s theory of the explanatory limitations of Darwinism. He aimed to provoke and he provoked. His troublemaking book has sparked the most exciting disputation in many years, because no question is more primary than the question of whether materialism (which Nagel defines as “the view that only the physical world is irreducibly real”) is true or false.
In fact, the question raised by Nagel is a very old question. It accounts for the so-called Socratic turn. The Athenian Socrates began his philosophical career as a would-be scientist. But somewhere along the way he realized that the process physics of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and their successors could not make sense of the greatest mystery of all: the existence of the scientist. Put in simple terms, the reductionist science of the materialists is self-refuting -- for it eventuates in the reduction of the scientist himself to mere matter in motion. It eventuates in a theory that explains in materialist terms why the theory itself is being proposed and thereby subverts any claim it has to be true. Reduce the scientist to a biochemical reaction and you destroy the science.
Nagel has returned to this conundrum with a vengeance. In doing so, he has broken ranks, and he has been relegated to the class of apostates. It is a good thing that he is 75 and not 25. If he were just starting his career, this book would have ended it.
The most vigorous denunciations have come from the ranks of the scientists. Wieseltier reminds us, however, that Nagel's book is not a work of science. It is a work of philosophy. It is, he observes,
entirely typical of the scientistic tyranny in American intellectual life that scientists have been invited to do the work of philosophers. The problem of the limits of science is not a scientific problem. It is also pertinent to note that the history of science is a history of mistakes, and so the dogmatism of scientists is especially rich. A few of Nagel’s scientific critics have been respectful: inThe New York Review of Books, H. Allen Orr has the decency to concede that it is not at all obvious how consciousness could have originated out of matter. But he then proceeds to an almost comic evasion. Finally, he says, we must suffice with “the mysteriousness of consciousness.” A Darwinii mysterium tremendum! He then cites Colin McGinn’s entirely unironic suggestion that our “cognitive limitations” may prevent us from grasping the evolution of mind from matter: “even if matter does give rise to mind, we might not be able to understand how.” Students of religion will recognize the dodge—it used to be called fideism, and atheists gleefully ridiculed it; and the expedient suspension of rational argument; and the double standard. What once vitiated godfulness now vindicates godlessness.
The thing that bothers Wieseltier the most, however, is another dimensiont of the attack on Nagel:
The most shabby aspect of the attack on Nagel’s heterodoxy has been its political motive. His book will be “an instrument of mischief,” it will “lend comfort (and sell a lot of copies) to the religious enemies of Darwinism,” and so on. It is bad for the left’s own culture war. Whose side is he on, anyway? Almost taunting the materialist left, which teaches skepticism but not self-skepticism, Nagel, who does not subscribe to intelligent design, describes some of its proponents as “iconoclasts” who “do not deserve the scorn with which they are commonly met.” I find this delicious, because it defies the prevailing regimentation of opinion and exemplifies a rebellious willingness to go wherever the reasoning mind leads. Cui bono? is not the first question that an intellectual should ask. The provenance of an idea reveals nothing about its veracity. “Accept the truth from whoever utters it,” said the rabbis, those poor benighted souls who had the misfortune to have lived so many centuries before Dennett and Dawkins.
I would like to think that Nagel's debunking of the scientistic orthodoxy now dominant in the academy would usher in a new age of sharp intellectual debate. But nothing that I see in the contemporary university suggests that such a dream is at all plausible. As long as the university is seen as a political instrument, there really are no grounds for hope.
After I posted my piece last night on The Perils of Intellectual Apostasy, a colleague drew my attention to the comments attracted by Leon Wieseltier's defense of Thomas Nagel's controversial recent book Mind and Cosmos.
These, too, deserve attention -- and none more so than the reply composed by Steven Pinker of Harvard University, which captures brilliantly the closed-mindedness that typifies the modern academy. Here is a juicy snippet:
The fact that Nagel’s wildly intemperate subtitle (that Darwinism is “almost certainly false”) will give ammunition to disturbing anti-science, anti-reason forces in the contemporary political power structure is, of course, not in itself a refutation of his argument. But surely it is not inappropriate of reviewers to bring this issue up. Nagel—and Wieseltier—have to know that there is a powerful and well-funded lobby in this country that is trying to discredit the entire institution of science as a close-minded, ideological propaganda front which is determined to promote a secular, materialistic, anti-Judaeo-Christian liberalism. This is emboldens them to blow off the scientific consensus about man-made climate change, corrupt science education, suppress research on gun violence, and criminalize lifesaving medical research. For several years Nagel has been expressing casual opinions and overstating claims in ways that are guaranteed to credit and energize this lobby. While the substance of his claims have to be evaluated on their merits, it is completely legitimate to criticize the way he has expressed them. This is not about the culture war. This is about the future of the planet.
If Wieseltier had wanted to gather further evidence for the strength of political correctness in the academy and the politicization of science, he could not have found anything elsewhere quite as compelling as this. When a distinguished scholar, such as Pinker, writes of "the scientific consensus about man-made climate change," you know he lives in a bubble where he talks only with those who agree with him. There never was such a consensus among scientists on this matter, and with every passing day there is less of one.

Monday, March 11, 2013


The Brain Activity Map
Hard cell
An ambitious project to map the brain is in the works. Possibly too ambitious
The Economist Mar 9th 2013 

NEWS of what protagonists hope will be America’s next big science project continues to dribble out. A leak to the New York Times, published on February 17th, let the cat out of the bag, with a report that Barack Obama’s administration is thinking of sponsoring what will be known as the Brain Activity Map. And on March 7th several of those protagonists published a manifesto for the project in Science.

The purpose of BAM is to change the scale at which the brain is understood. At the moment, neuroscience operates at two disconnected levels. The higher one, where the dimensions of features are measured in centimetres, has many techniques at its disposal, notably functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI), which measures changes in tissues’ fuel consumption. This lets researchers see which bits of the brain are active in particular tasks—as long as those tasks can be performed by a person lying down inside a scanner.
At the other end of the scale, where features are measured in microns, lots of research has been done on how individual nerve cells work, how messages are sent from one to another, and how the connections between cells strengthen and weaken as memories are formed. Between these two, though, all is darkness. It is like trying to navigate America with an atlas that shows the states, the big cities and the main highways, and has a few street maps of local neighbourhoods, but displays nothing in between. BAM, if all goes well, will yield plans of entire towns and villages, and start to fill in the road network. It will also, to push the analogy to breaking point, let a user look at actual traffic flows on the roads in question, and even manipulate the road signs, in order to understand how particular communities work.

The mappers’ aim is to find out how nerve cells collaborate to process information. That means looking at the connections between hundreds, thousands and even millions of adjacent cells—and doing so, crucially, while those cells are still alive, rather than after they have been sliced and diced for microscopic examination.
[Keep in mind that these millions of neurons are out of some 100,000,000,000 neurons in the brain – a proportion of 1 to 100,000. So even if this overly ambitious project succeeds, it will be light-years from mapping the brain tout courte. D.G.]

This will require a new set of tools. And the guts of the BAM proposal are that the American taxpayer should provide those tools. It is thus no coincidence that the lead author of the paper, Paul Alivisatos, the director of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, is a materials scientist, not a neuroscientist. Dr Alivisatos and his ten colleagues would like their new tools to be able to record, simultaneously, the activity of millions of nerve cells. Then, having done the recording, they would like a second toolkit that lets them manipulate each cell at will, to see what effect that has on the rest of the circuit. Finally, to handle the unprecedented amounts of data that the first and second steps will generate, they would like a new set of computing hardware and software.
A modest proposal, then. And one which is inducing polite scepticism from many neuroscientists who are not part of the charmed circle, and who fear their subject is about to be sacrificed to a juggernaut.
Such scepticism is reasonable. The third part of the project, the computer side, should be doable. That is just a question of pushing harder in a direction things are, in any case, going. How you would do the first two, though, is anybody’s guess—and Dr Alivisatos and his colleagues are pretty sketchy about the details.

Thinking big, thinking small

What ideas there are draw heavily on the nascent field of nanotechnology. This is Dr Alivisatos’s particular province, and also that of the Kavli Foundation, which exists “to advance fundamental research in the fields of astrophysics, nanoscience, neuroscience and theoretical physics”. A brain map would push two of those buttons, which accounts for the fact that five of the manifesto’s authors work for institutes sponsored by this foundation. But any successes that nanotechnology has enjoyed so far have been small beer compared with the devices that would be needed to interrogate nerve cells, record the results and transmit them back to base, let alone tell those nerve cells what to do.

The protagonists would, they say, build up slowly, using humbler creatures than human beings as experimental subjects to start with. This was the approach taken by the Human Genome Project, which began with bacteria and yeast, progressed to worms, flies and mice, and only then tackled people. But the analogy is not quite a fair one. When the genome project started, genomicists already had a basic understanding of how to go about it. That understanding was vastly refined and improved by the application of several billion dollars. But it was there from the beginning.

Going from existing methods of recording and manipulating cell activity, which rely on large electrodes, often connected to the outside world by physical wires, to the massively parallel, wireless system envisaged by Dr Alivisatos, is a different proposition. It may be possible. But it requires a leap of faith. The next few weeks will reveal whether that faith is shared by a cash-strapped president.


Design Can Be Suboptimal on Purpose

Evolutionists wrongly argue that ID can't be true because some designs are not optimal. But there might be a perfectly intelligent reason for some suboptimal designs in nature.
"When It Comes to Genetic Code, Researchers Prove Optimum Isn't Always Best," according tothe news from Texas A&M University. For example, "Imagine two steel springs identical in look and composition but that perform differently because each was tempered at a different rate." Engineers might want the springs to perform differently, and temper them that way for a reason.
Turning to the living cell, the researchers considered how variations in the coding of the biological clock can create similar timing differences. Their finding is related to our comments the other day on the "snooze button" on the biological clock. They were part of the team that found out how synonymous codons allow for timing differences that fine-tune circadian rhythms. Applying their analogy about tempered springs, we learn:
The group's research indicates that the protein in the fungal genus Neurospora they studied, frequency, performs better when the genetic code specifying it has non-optimal codon usage, as is normally found. However, when the genetic code is deliberately altered so that codon usage is optimized, clock function is lost. The reason for this is that non-optimal codon usage slows translation of the genetic code into protein, allotting the frequency protein the necessary time to achieve its optimal protein structure.
The team's results also demonstrate that genetic codons do more than simply determine the amino acid sequence of a protein as previously thought: They also affect how much protein can be made as well as the functional quality of that protein. (Emphasis added.)
So what at first appeared sloppy or suboptimal actually has a purpose. "Less is more" sometimes. Even though an alternate codon specifies the same amino acid, it can affect the action of the resulting enzymatic reaction through timing.
Also noteworthy about the news from Texas A&M is its elevated praise of design in the biological clock:
"Living organisms' inner clocks are like Swiss watches with precisely manufactured spring mechanisms," said Matthew Sachs, a professor in the Texas A&M Department of Biology. "For example, if you fast-temper a critical spring, the watch may be unable to keep time, as opposed to slow-tempering it. It's not just about the composition of the components, such as which alloy is used. It's about the manner in which the components are made. Our research says the genetic code is important for determining both composition and fabrication rate for a central component of the circadian clock, and that the fabrication rate also is critical. And that's essentially a discovery."
Swiss watch, you say? That sounds almost like an echo of Paley. But Paley's approach was natural theology. This approach is intelligent design: finding complex specified information, functioning with a purpose, that implies not necessarily a deity, but an intelligent cause that can be rightly inferred scientifically from our uniform experience with what intelligence routinely does.
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Monday, March 4, 2013

The Scientific American February 2013 contains the following iconoclastic articles:


New Simulations Question the Gulf Stream’s Role in Tempering Europe’s Winters

It's the flow of warm tropical water across the Atlantic that keeps European winters mild, right? Maybe not
For a century, schoolchildren have been taught that the massive ocean current known as the Gulf Stream carries warm water from the tropical Atlantic Ocean to northwestern Europe. As it arrives, the water heats the air above it. That air moves inland, making winter days in Europe milder than they are in the northeastern U.S.
It might be time to retire that tidy story. The explosion of interest in global climate has prompted scientists to closely study the climatic effects of the Gulf Stream only to discover that those effects are not as clear as conventional wisdom might suggest. Based on modeling work and ocean data, new explanations have emerged for why winter in northern Europe is generally less bitter than winter at the same latitudes in the northeastern U.S. and Canada—and the models differ on the Gulf Stream's role. One of the explanations also provides insight into why winter in the U.S. Northwest is warmer than it is across the Pacific in eastern Russia.
At the same time, recent studies have been casting doubt on the popular conjecture made a few years ago that melting of Arctic ice could “shut down” the Gulf Stream, thereby wreaking havoc with Europe'sweather. Yet the studies do suggest that climate change could at least affect thestrength of the Gulf Stream, which could lessen the impact of global warming on northern Europe.
....later on in the article they say the gulf stream theory is refuted.......




A Single Brain Cell Stores a Single Concept [Preview]

Each concept—each person or thing in our everyday experience—may have a set of corresponding neurons assigned to it

...in which are described the two theories of memory - millions of cells widely distributed in the brain, or narrow simple storage - that are still in competition after several decades. New discoveries lend some support to the latter, but memory storage in the brain is still not understood. Show this to those who think "science" understands the brain. 


Is the Free-Radical Theory of Aging Dead? [Preview]

The hallowed notion that oxidative damage causes aging and that vitamins might preserve our youth is now in doubt
David Gems's life was turned upside down in 2006 by a group of worms that kept on living when they were supposed to die. As assistant director of the Institute of Healthy Aging at University College London, Gems regularly runs experiments on Caenorhabditis elegans, a roundworm that is often used to study the biology of aging. In this case, he was testing the idea that a buildup of cellular damage caused by oxidation—technically, the chemical removal of electrons from a molecule by highly reactive compounds, such as free radicals—is the main mechanism behind aging. According to this theory, rampant oxidation mangles more and more lipids, proteins, snippets of DNA and other key components of cells over time, eventually compromising tissues and organs and thus the functioning of the body as a whole.

Gems genetically engineered the roundworms so they no longer produced certain enzymes that act as naturally occurring antioxidants by deactivating free radicals. Sure enough, in the absence of the antioxidants, levels of free radicals in the worms skyrocketed and triggered potentially damaging oxidative reactions throughout the worms' bodies.
Show this one to those who think taking anti-oxidants helps prevent aging. In fact the whole understaning of he process of aging is now in doubt> 


Will Scientists Ever Be Able to Piece Together Humanity's Early Origins? [Preview]

New fossil discoveries complicate the already devilish task of identifying our most ancient progenitors
By Katherine Harmon 

mammals, do. This familiar yet strange individual is Lucy, a member of the species Australopithecus afarensis, who lived some 3.2 million years ago. She is one of the oldest creatures presumed to have strode on the evolutionary path leading to our species, Homo sapiens.
From a distance, you probably would have assumed her to be human. Although she stood only about a meter tall, with long arms and a small head, she walked, if perhaps slightly inelegantly, upright on two legs, as we, alone among living mammals, do. This familiar yet strange individual is Lucy, a member of the species Australopithecus afarensis, who lived some 3.2 million years ago. She is one of the oldest creatures presumed to have strode on the evolutionary path leading to our species,Homo sapiens.
When Lucy was uncovered in 1974, evidence of bipedal locomotion virtually guaranteed her kind a spot in the human family tree. And although scientists had an inkling that other branches of humans coexisted more recently alongside our own, early human evolution appeared to be a simple affair, with Lucy and the other ancient bipeds that eventually came to light belonging to the same lone lineage. Thus, the discoveries seemed to uphold the notion of human evolution as a unilinear “march of progress” from a knuckle-walking chimplike ape to our striding, upright form—a schema that has dominated paleoanthropology for the past century. Yet as researchers dig back further in time, our origins are turning out to be a lot more complicated than that iconic image would suggest.

...indeed, in the body of the article it is suggested that it is unrealistic to expect that the lineage of homo sapiens will ever be established. 

And finally:


Human and Grasshopper Ears Are Remarkably Similar

Katydid ear structures resemble those of humans
In a striking example of how two unrelated creatures can evolve similar traits, researchers have discovered that a rain—forest grasshopper has ears remarkably like those of humans and other mammals-even though its hearing organ is tucked into the crook of its front legs.
The insect, a yellow-orange-faced katydid (Copiphora gorgonensis) from Gorgona Island in Colombia, has ear structures that are similar to the human eardrum and cochlea. As sound waves approach the katydid's legs, they rock a thin membrane akin to a human eardrum. This membrane translates larger movements from air-pressure waves to smaller, more powerful motions in another structure called the cuticle plate. The plate, in turn, creates ripples in a fluid-filled chamber akin to an unfurled human cochlea. Inside this chamber, sensory cells are arranged like a keyboard from high-to low-frequency sensitivity, much like in humans.

C. gorgonensis's exquisitely evolved ear may help it avoid predators such as bats, says sensory biologist Fernando Montealegre-Z, now at the University of Lincoln in England and lead author of the study, which appeared in Science. The finding “is yet another remarkable demonstration of convergent evolution,” says Ronald R. Hoy, a professor of neurobiology at Cornell University, who was not involved in the work.
The efficiency of this minuscule system could inspire engineers to create microsensors based on the katydid’s ear design—for example, for use in hearing aids. Such sensors could be less fragile, smaller and more sensitive, potentially spurring applications we have not thought of yet.

...Of course the  credit is given to evolution. But one would like to knkow: are there other related insects that also have "ears" similar to humans? And if not, what is the pathway of gradual change that led to this unique structure in insects? 

The lesson for cautious thinkers: expect what the textbooks say today to be largely rejected tomorrow [or next year, or next decade.....].




Thursday, February 7, 2013

H Allen Orr on Mind and Cosmos by Thomas Nagel; New York Review of Books.

Orr has written a thoughtful and calm critique of Nagel's new book. Nevertheless, along with the hysterical critics, he fails to engage nagel's oint - even those he quotes at length. Below is a critical example. I hope to add more.

2.


Nagel believes that materialism confronts two classes of problems. One, which is new to Nagel’s thought, concerns purported empirical problems with neo-Darwinism. The other, which is more familiar to philosophers, is the alleged failure of materialism to explain consciousness and allied mental phenomena.

Nagel argues that there are purely “empirical reasons” to be skeptical about reductionism in biology and, in particular, about the plausibility of neo-Darwinism. Nagel’s claims here are so surprising that it’s best to quote them at length:

[I am adding the numerals – D.G.]

I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of life. (1) It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the mechanism of natural selection. (2) We are expected to abandon this naïve response, not in favor of a fully worked out physical/chemical explanation but (3) in favor of an alternative that is really a schema for explanation, supported by some examples. (4) What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible argument that the story has a nonnegligible probability of being true. There are two questions. (4a) First, given what is known about the chemical basis of biology and genetics, what is the likelihood that self-reproducing life forms should have come into existence spontaneously on the early earth, solely through the operation of the laws of physics and chemistry? (4b) The second question is about the sources of variation in the evolutionary process that was set in motion once life began: In the available geological time since the first life forms appeared on earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should have occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to produce the organisms that actually exist?

[[Let’s take stock. Nagel is making five points. (1) Our intuition rebels at the thought that life is the result of an unguided process. (2) We are supposed to abandon that intuition (3) in favour of an idea which at present is only a schema, not an articulated theory. (4) The chief schematic element is the lack of any reason to believe that the probability of truth of the idea is non-negligible. This lack of reason applies to specific areas: (4a) the origin of life [self-replicators], and (4b) adequate sources of variation based solely on accidental changes to genetic material. Note that (4), (4a) and (4b) point out lack of reason to believe in non-negligible probability.



Now let’s look at Orr’s discussion below and see if we can find answers to these five points.]]

Nagel claims that both questions concern “highly specific events over a long historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is very indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important part.” He therefore concludes that “the available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of scientific opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us to subordinate the incredulity of common sense.”



[[Right, since very indirect evidence for highly specific events in the distant past does not give adequate reason to believe in non-negligible probability of truth.]]

This conclusion is remarkable in a couple ways. For one thing, there’s not much of an argument here. Instead Nagel’s conclusion rests largely on the strength of his intuition. His intuition recoils from the claimed plausibility of neo-Darwinism and that, it seems, is that.

[[Look at that sentence again. What happened to points (2)-(4b)!?!]]

(Richard Dawkins has called this sort of move the argument from personal incredulity.) But plenty of scientific truths are counterintuitive (does anyone find it intuitive that we’re hurtling around the sun at 67,000 miles per hour?) and a scientific education is, to a considerable extent, an exercise in taming the authority of one’s intuition. Nagel never explains why his intuition should count for so much here.



[[Again, look at (2)-(4b). Is there any comparison to the motion of the earth here? Is the motion of the earth a highly specific fact in the distant past for which we have only very indirect evidence?]]

As for his claim that evolutionary theory is somewhat schematic and that it concerns events that happened long ago, leaving indirect evidence, this is partly true of any historical science, including any alternative to neo-Darwinism, e.g., the one that Nagel himself suggests.

[[So what? We are discussing a reason to abandon a strong intuition. Maybe other historical sciences do not challenge such intuitions. Or maybe they too should be rejected!]]

In any case, a good part of the evidence for neo-Darwinism is not indirect but involves experiments in which evolutionary change is monitored in real time.2

[[Don't worry about the footnote. It refers to evolutionary change in bacteria only, and that has been roundly criticised here: http://www.discovery.org/a/18121 [download the pdf and look for bacterial speciation].]]

More important, Nagel’s conclusions about evolution are almost certainly wrong. The origin of life is admittedly a hard problem and we don’t know exactly how the first self-replicating system arose. But big progress has been made. The discovery of so-called ribozymes in the 1980s plausibly cracked the main principled problem at the heart of the origin of life.

[[Read that sentence again. “Plausibly cracked the main problem.” That means we do not know for sure the main problem has been cracked. And even if it has – the main problem indicated that the natural origin of DNA-proteins is impossible. Plausibly cracking that problem only shows that it is possible. But Nagel’s claim is that we have no reason to think it is probable. Noting Orr says here relates to Nagel’s point. ]]

Research on life’s origin had always faced a chicken and egg dilemma: DNA, our hereditary material, can’t replicate without the assistance of proteins, but one can’t get the required proteins unless they’re encoded by DNA. So how could the whole system get off the ground?

Answer: the first genetic material was probably RNA, not DNA. This might sound like a distinction without a difference but it isn’t. The point is that RNA molecules can both act as a hereditary material (as DNA does) and catalyze certain chemical reactions (as some proteins do), possibly including their own replication. (An RNA molecule that can catalyze a reaction is called a ribozyme.) Consequently, many researchers into the origins of life now believe in an “RNA world,” in which early life on earth was RNA-based. “Physical accidents” were likely still required to produce the first RNA molecules, but we can now begin to see how these molecules might then self-replicate.

Nagel’s astonishment that a “sequence of viable genetic mutations” has been available to evolution over billions of years is also unfounded.3 His concern appears to be that evolution requires an unbroken chain of viable genetic variants that connect the first living creature to, say, human beings. How could nature ensure that a viable mutation was always available to evolution?

[[Hmmm – “his concern seems to be….” – does that not sound like an invitation to a straw man? “I guess this is bothering Nagel, so here is the answer….” But nothing in Nagel’s words suggest so naïve an idea. Even taking all the extinctions into account, and without species chauvinism [or order, or class chauvinism], Nagel says that the evidence for availability of mutations does not make the story probable. Nothing Orr says casts doubt on Nagel’s statement.]]

The answer is that it didn’t. That’s why species go extinct. Indeed that’s what extinction is. The world changes and a species can’t find a mutation fast enough to let it live. Extinction is the norm in evolution: the vast majority of all species have gone extinct. Nagel has, I think, been led astray by a big survivorship bias: the evolutionary lineage that led to us always found a viable mutation, ergo one must, it seems, always be available. Tyrannosaurus rex would presumably be less impressed by nature’s munificence.4